Adequacy of Representation\u27 in Time (Or Why the Result in Stephenson is Correct) by Dana, David A.
Northwestern University School of Law
Public Law and Legal Theory Papers
Year  Paper 
Adequacy of Representation’ in Time (Or
Why the Result in Stephenson is Correct)
David A. Dana∗
∗Northwestern University School of Law, d-dana@law.northwestern.edu
This working paper is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be commer-
cially reproduced without the permission of the copyright holder.
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art13
Copyright c©2004 by the author.
Adequacy of Representation’ in Time (Or
Why the Result in Stephenson is Correct)
David A. Dana
Abstract
This essay sketches a Rawlsian defense of allowing subsequent challenges to class
action settlements, as in the Stephenson agent orange case and the Homeside Bank
Boston case. My normative claim is that the Rawlsian original position is a helpful
way of thinking about what a fair distribution among class members entails that
is, we should ask whether a settlement conceivably could have been agreed to by
class members standing behind a veil of ignorance as to what their particular po-
sition or place within the class would be beyond the veil. Subsequent challenges
to settlements should be permitted where no reasonable class member standing
behind the veil of ignorance, employing maximum decisionmaking, would have
consented to the settlement. I also argue that proposed reforms in the manner by
which judges approve class action settlements, while perhaps sensible, will not
eliminate the problem of inadequate representation, and that the availability of
such subsequent challenges based on inadequacy of representation will not appre-
ciably reduce the settlement rate in class actions or otherwise destroy the class
action as a dispute resolution mechanism.
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David A. Dana, Northwestern University School of Law 
 
   Judges, of course, must certify class actions for the class actions to proceed, and 
must approve class settlements for those any class settlements to have legal effect.  Judges may 
or may not make explicit findings regarding the adequacy of representation class members 
received, but even where then are no explicit findings, judicial certification of a class and 
approval of a class settlement arguably implies a finding of adequacy of representation.  Why 
then should class members ever be able to challenge the settlement in subsequent actions?  Why 
shouldn’t they be bound to the settlement if a court explicitly, or even jus t implicitly, has held 
that they were adequately represented in the process that produced the settlement? 
To answer that question, we must first unpack the concept of “adequate 
representation.”  Adequacy of representation in the class context cannot mean what it means in 
non-class litigation – that the lawyer faithfully attend to the client’s interest, advise the client of 
the various options available to her, and give her the opportunity to make the ultimate decisions 
about whether to accept or reject a settlement offer.  In the non-class-action litigation context, the 
client is actually present, or at least could be if she so chooses.  It seems reasonable, therefore, 
that the law hold her to the choices she made even if those choices result in different 
consequences than those that she anticipated.1  In the class action context, the client –the class 
members or at least almost all of them – are not present ; indeed, many class members are never 
aware of even the existence of the class litigation to which they are, in theory, a party.  They are 
represented only virtually, by means of class representatives. And since class representatives are 
                                                 
1 One can certainly question how present non-class-action clients actually are in some litigation settings.  But, 
at least compared to class members, and most dramatically class members in “futures” classes, the ordinary 
plaintiff is more capable of meaningful participation in litigation decisionmaking.  At the least, the non-class 
action client, unlike the class action client, must take some volitional action in the litigation – namely, 
contract to hire his or her lawyer. 
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almost always nominal actors,2, the absent class members are in truth represented only by class 
counsel, acting, typically, with minimal or no real client input.  
Under such circumstances it is ludicrous to tell a class member that, because she 
somehow “agreed” by means of virtual representation to a settlement of which she may well 
have been entirely unaware, she must accept little or no or even negative compensation as the 
dispositive relief for an otherwise cognizable legal wrong to her.  To state the point slightly 
differently: because class members do not hire counsel, because they are absent from the 
litigation, because they often do not receive even meaningful notice of proposed settlements, and 
because they do not actually consent to class settlements, it seems fair to hold them to a 
settlement – and to bar them from later seeking relief notwithstanding a settlement – only if the 
relief provided to them by the settlement is something that a reasonable person conceivably 
would have accepted, had she been given the choice, in return for ceding for all time her legal 
claims for redress.  
Thus, although the adequacy of representation inquiry certainly entails an 
examination into the pre-settlement structure of representation and the content of the 
proceedings, the inquiry also has, or at least should have, something to do with ex post 
substantive outcomes – about what the settlement actually delivers in the way of relief to 
individual class members.  Even if (and its a big if, as I discuss below) a court takes a very hard 
look at the proposed settlement to try to discern which kinds of class members will get what 
from the settlement, it may be impossible for the court to discern this information at the time the 
                                                 
2  Professor Mullenix argues that class representatives could be a more meaningful source of class member 
representation if class counsel took more care in the selection process, see [Symposium Contribution], but I 
am doubtful of this claim.  Meaningful participation in class litigation is simply too time-consuming and 
otherwise costly to be worth the effort for class representatives in class actions involving small individual 
stakes, and in all class actions there are bound to be issues of typicality – that is, the representatives’ position 
and interests and tastes are not the same as that of other class members. 
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approval decision must be made.  Adequacy or inadequacy of representation, as a practical 
matter, sometimes unfolds only over time. 
   From this perspective, the perspective that adequacy of representation in a class 
action must mean at least that a rational person could have agreed to accept the relief  at issue in 
return for ceding her legal claims, the Second Circuit’s holding in Dow Chemical v.Stephenson3 
and the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision in State of Vermont v. Homeside Lending4 seem 
unremarkable, even obvious ly correct.  In Homeside, the Vermont Supreme Court held that bank 
boston customers whose accounts were reduced as a result of a class action settlement with the 
bank had not been adequately represented, and hence could bring a subsequent challenge. 5 In 
Stephenson, the Second Circuit held that veterans exposed to agent orange who became ill more 
than ten years after the 1984 settlement date,6 but received no cash payments from the settlement 
fund,7 had not been adequately represented, and hence were not barred from bringing a 
subsequent challenge.8   It is unreasonable to suppose that class members actually would have 
agreed to settlement that did nothing but financially penalize them (as in Homeside), or that 
provided them no relief whatever (as in Stephenson).  
                                                 
3 273 F.3d 249., aff’d without opinion (by a 4-4 vote), 123 S.Ct. 2161 (2003). 
4 826 A.2d 997 (Vt. 2003). 
5 Id. at 1016-17. 
6  The class definition in the agent orange litigation was extremely broad, including all exposed military 
personnel whose exposure occurred between 1961 and 1972, and spouses, parents, and children of the 
exposed persons who were born before January 1, 1984 and who might suffer derivative injury.  273 F.3d at 
252.  Thus, read literally, the settlement would treat as a class member a baby born with agent orange-related 
birth defects on December 31, 1983, even if the effects did not become manifest until after December 31, 
1994. 
7  The 1984 settlement provided for Dow to pay $180 million into a settlement fund.  Three-quarters of the he 
money was dedicated to for cash payments to class members who became ill before 1995. Most of the rest ( it 
is hard to pin down exactly how much) was dedicated to the creation of a medical foundation.  Brief for the 
Petitoners, Dow v. Stephenson,  2002 US. Briefs 271, at 9.  Nothing in the opinions in the Stephenson 
litigation or the briefs filed in the Supreme Court documents point to any concrete benefits provided by the 
medical foundation to veterans who became ill after December 31, 1994.  Indeed, as far as I know, there I no 
evidence of concrete benefits provided by the foundation to any class members.  Perhaps one could argue 
that, in 1984, it would have been reasonable to suppose that the foundation would produce concrete, and 
substantial, benefits for veterans who would become ill after 1994.  But I see no support for that view in any 
of the court filings or opinions. 
8. 273 F.3d at 260-61. 
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Yet the holdings in Stephenson and Homeside, allowing subsequent challenges, are 
far from uncontroversial.   The Vermont Supreme Court’s decision was several years in the 
making, which suggests that that court regarded the case as difficult. For its part, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed a federal district court’s dismissal of a subsequent challenge to the bank boston 
settlement that had been filed in the Northern District of Illinois before the Vermont state 
attorney general proceeded with its action in Vermont.9. And, of course, the Supreme Court in 
Stephenson affirmed the Second Circuit only by a 4 to 4 vote; if Justice Stevens had participated 
in the decision, Stephenson may well have been overruled. 
   My normative claim is that a rule allowing challenges to settlements that no 
reasonable class member could have accepted comports with our basic intuitions of fairness and 
justice; that reforms in the manner by which judges approve class action settlements, while 
perhaps sensible, will not eliminate the problem of inadequate representation; and that the 
availability of such subsequent challenges based on inadequacy of representation will not 
appreciably reduce the settlement rate in class actions or otherwise destroy the class action as a 
dispute resolution mechanism.  To Professor Kahan and Silberman’s call for the courts to “Do It 
Right But Do It Once,”10 I respond “Try To Do It Right The First Time But If Need Be, Try 
Again.” 
A.  A (Loose) Rawlsian Approach to Class Actions  
   In A Theory of Justice11 and Justice as Fairness,12 Rawls developed a conception 
of justice – and the just distribution of entitlements within society – by means of resort to a 
                                                 
9 Kamilewicz v. Bank Boston Corp., 92 F3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996), rehearing en banc denied, 100 F.2d 1348 (7th 
Cir. 1996). 
10  Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, the Proper Role for Collateral Attack in Class Actions: A Reply to 
Allen, Miller, and Morrison, 73 NYU L REV 1193, 1999 (1998). 
11 John Rawls, a Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA Harvard U. Press 1971). 
12 Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA Harvard U. Press 2001), 
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hypothetical reality, “the original position.”  In the original position, people do not know what 
their particular characteristics in society will be –their family background, their class, their race, 
and so on.13  They also do not have enough information to assess the probabilities of who they 
might be14; for example, they lack any way of knowing whether there is a 1% or 20% chance 
they will be born with a disability.  As Rawls notes, the people in the original position, therefore, 
must make decisions under “uncertainty” in the sense economists typically deploy that term.15 
   Rawls argues that people in the original position are likely to employ a maximin 
principle – a principle that maximizes their welfare in the event they should be born into the 
lowest, most disadvantaged rung in the social hierarchy.  In Rawls’ language, the maximin rule 
“tells us to identify the worst outcome of each available alternative and then to adopt the 
alternative whose worst outcome is better than the worst outcome of all the other alternatives.”16 
Rawls argues that the maximin principle is consistent with risk neutrality17, but one could argue 
(and some have) that the principle attributes a degree of risk aversion to human beings.   
   The class action settlement can be conceptualized as presenting a problem of 
distributive justice among a society of class members and counsel, akin to the broader question 
of societal distributive justice that Rawls is addressing, and hence suitable for original 
position/veil of ignorance analysis.  The class members and their lawyers must distribute class 
settlement wealth among themselves.  Consent would seem to be the best, and perhaps only 
                                                 
13 Justice as Fairness, at 15 (“In the original position, the parties are not allowed to know the social positions 
or the particular comprehensive doctrines of the persons they represent.  They also do not know persons’ race 
and ethnic group, sex, and various native endowments . . . . “).  
14  Justice as Fairness, at 98 (“Since the maxim in rule takes no account of probabilities, that is, of how likely 
it is that the circumstances obtain for their respective worst outcomes to be realized, the first condition [of 
decisionmaking behind the veil of ignorance in the original position] is that the parties have no reliable basis 
for estimating the probabilities of the possible social circumstances that affect the fundamental interests of the 
persons they represent.”). 
15 Justice as Fairness, at 15-18, 106. 
16 Id. at 96. 
17  Id. at 106-107. 
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legitimate, means of distributing the wealth, at least if we begin with the liberal conception of 
each person as fundamentally equal in dignity and autonomy.  However, consent, at least actual 
consent, is unworkable, given the overwhelming transactions costs that would be entailed in 
reaching agreement.  A standard based on what hypothetical agreement would allow – as in the 
original position exercise – may be the best we can do to obtain a rough sense of the outer limits 
of what is a fair distribution in the class context.   
   The notion that individuals are generally risk averse in negotiating hypothetical 
agreements behind a veil of ignorance -- a notion that, again, may be embedded in the Rawlsian 
approach, Rawls’s assertions to the contrary notwithstanding – is particularly plausible if we 
posit two things about the people in the original position.  First, they believe that individuals in 
the society beyond the veil could not, as a matter of course, self- insure against risks of losses 
through personal portfolio diversification.  Second, they believe that individuals in the society 
beyond the veil could not, again as a matter of course, “hedge” risks through the purchase of 
commercial insurance.18 
Both of these conditions for risk averse decision-making, it seems to me, would be 
satisfied by veterans who might become ill from agent orange exposure as they stood behind the 
hypothetical veil of ignorance at the time of the settlement in 1984.  As Rawls emphasizes, 
people behind the veil “know the general facts about human society,” including” the basis of 
social organization,” “laws of human psychology,” and indeed “whatever general facts affect the 
choice . . . .”19  The veterans behind the veil thus would know that not everyone in the society 
beyond the veil would be so wealthy as to be able to self- insure against the risk of monetary loss 
from agent-orange-related disease (although they would not know how wealthy (or not) the 
                                                 
18  Cites. 
19  Theory of Justice, at 119. 
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particular person or persons they represent would be).  They also would understand how the 
commercial insurance markets operate, so they would understand that, once veterans became 
sick with agent-orange-related disease, they would no longer be able to purchase health and life 
insurance that might mitigate the economic consequences of the sickness.  They also would 
understand enough about human psychology – about the limits of human beings to seek out, 
collect and assimilate complicated information, about the tendency of people to avoid thinking 
about “fuzzy” or highly contested or nonquantifiable risks that might manifest if at all only in the 
remote future – that they would understand that many veterans who in fact had been exposed to 
agent orange would not invest the time and resources to learn that they had been exposed and 
what the exposure might mean for their long-tern health d that they had been exposed until it was 
too late to purchase any additional insurance – that is, until they were ill. 
So let us assume, then, that the veterans behind the veil are risk averse, indeed, 
quite markedly risk averse..  They do not know if they have been exposed to agent orange.  They 
also do not know when, if ever, they would become sick as a result of any exposure.  Again, 
assume “they have no basis for probability calculations.”20  If class members in the (as it were ) 
class action original position could not assess the difference in the probability that they would 
become ill in 1994 and the probability that they would become ill in 1995, would they agree to 
an arrangement whereby they would receive substantial recovery if they became ill in 1994 but 
nothing at all if they became ill in 1995?  The 1984 settlement cannot be squared with the 
predicted maximin decisionmaking under a veil of ignorance. 
Similarly, the bank boston settlement cannot be squared with the Rawlsian original 
position approach.  Because bank boston customers behind the veil would not know whether the 
customer(s) they represent would gain or lose money as a result of the settlement at issue in the 
                                                 
20  Id. at 134. 
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bank boston litigation, they would focus, as per the maximin principle, on protecting the 
customers they represent from the possibility of losing money.  They would reject the settlement 
and demand that every customer gain something by virtue of settlement.  It is true that the case 
for risk-averse decisionmaking in the bank boston case –and other cases involving small sums of 
money per class member – is weaker than in the agent orange case because self- insurance may 
be assumed by customers behind the veil to be generally available in the society beyond the veil 
with respect to very small monetary losses, and in any event risk aversion is generally thought to 
increase in intensity with the magnitude of the risks.21  On the other hand, the customers behind 
the veil also would understand another “law of human psychology” – the endowment effect22 --  
which would lead them to understand that customers who saw their existing accounts reduced by 
(for example) $300 would assess that loss as having a greater magnitude than the failure to 
realize a gain of $300. 
   Robert Nagareda, in an important recent article criticizing the result in Stephenson, 
argues that the December 31, 1994 cutoff for monetary relief in the agent orange class settlement 
was justified because some sort of cutoff – some line – has to be drawn in any arrangement.  
According to Nagareda, “[t]he essence of any settlement is to . . . draw lines, to create fissures, to 
make distinctions not already apparent in the litigation . . . . “23.  But class counsel in the agent 
orange litigation could have settled for relief to be provided for persons who became sick on or 
before December 31, 1994, but left out of the settlement those who might become sick after 
December 31, 1994.  Under such circumstances, veterans who became sick after 1994 would not 
have been forced to fight the claim that they had implicitly consented to a settlement that gave 
                                                 
21 Cites. 
22 Cites. 




them nothing; they could sue for relief without facing the obstacle of preclusion.  Of course, 
Dow in 1984 might have resisted paying as much for a settlement that left unresolved any claims 
of people who might became sick after 1994, but such resistance would have been proof that the 
possibility of veterans becoming ill after 1994 was a realistic one in the mind of the party that 
arguably had the best (if still radically incomplete) information about agent orange and its 
effects. 
 This Rawlsian approach to adequacy of representation might be criticized as so blurry, so 
open-ended, that it could be used to challenge any distributive arrangement as unjust.  But the 
argument I am making here is that settlements should be subject to challenge to the extent they 
could not, by any stretch of reasoning, be justified as the hypothetical bargain that class members 
in an original position would have accepted.  Thus, the burden of persuasion, and a substantial 
burden at that, would be on the party challenging the settlement as based on inadequate 
representation.  The set of class action settlements that would be vulnerable under this approach 
thus should be relatively small. 
 Nonetheless, the Rawlsian original position approach, to be sure, does introduce some line-
drawing problems – that is, unless we strictly limit the approach to cases where some class 
members are accorded zero or negative relief.  A rule allowing subsequent review only in 
negative or zero recovery cases, while appealing from an ease-of-administration perspective, has 
the disadvantage of precluding subsequent challenges even in some problematic cases, e.g., cases 
involving settlements in which some injured class members receive a great deal of money while 
others with equally severe injuries receive only a nominal sum, say, $500 or $1,000.  In the end, 
there is an unavoidable tradeoff to be made, and a balance to be struck, between considerations 
of administration and considerations of fairness and hence legitimacy.  
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   Another possible objection to the preceding analysis is that it overstates the extent 
to which class members are absent, and understates the extent to which class members consent, if 
only implicitly, to proposed class action settlements..  In some cases at least, class members do 
receive notice and an opportunity to opt out of class litigation.  In such cases, can the class 
members’ decision not to opt out be construed as implicit consent to the terms of the settlement, 
such that there is no need to resort to discussion of hypothetical grants of consent?.  In my view, 
the answer, in general, is no.24 
For an opt out to qualify as proof of implicit consent to a settlement, the class 
member would have to receive genuinely comprehensible notice of the existence of the class at a 
time when the class member could reasonably be expected to understand she falls within the 
class definition; and genuinely comprehensible notice of the proposed settlement, including 
sufficient information for her to readily discern what she would receive or not receive depending 
on plainly-articulated contingencies.  In addition, the class member would have to be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to opt out of the class after receiving the notice of the proposed 
settlement.   
These conditions were not met in either the bank boston or agent orange class 
actions.  Indeed, because the agent orange litigation included “futures” (who did not even 
understand themselves to be injured parties as of 1984, and who therefore did not self- identify as 
class members25), it is hard to even imagine how any of the conditions listed above could have 
been met in the agent orange litigation. 
                                                 
24  For a contrary view, see Marcel Kahan & Linda Silverman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of the State 
Courts in Class Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 219, 268. 
25  See, e.g., Brief of Appellant Isaacson in Stephenson v. Dow, Second Circuit, Jan. 23, 2001, available at 
2001 WL 34455606, at 5-6 (explaining that “[b]e cause Isaacson was not aware of any injury until his cancer 
diagnosis in 1996, he had no reason in the early 1980s to file a lawsuit related to Agent Orange, consult with 
an attorney, or contact the Veterans Administration regarding his exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam.”). 
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  Moreover, the bank boston and agent orange litigation aside, notice and opt-out procedures, 
as currently understood and implemented, generally have limited utility for class members. Class 
action notices, regarding either the proposed certification of a class or proposed adoption of a 
settlement, are often so convoluted that few lawyers or law professors can understand them.  
Some class actions do not afford an opt out right at either the time of certification or proposed 
settlement, and an opt out at the latter time is not required by Federal Rule 23 for any sort of 
class action.26 
Perhaps notice and opt-out procedures could be enhanced, but enhancements will 
not solve the problem of the absence of meaningful consent in class actions.  For one thing, as 
already suggested, cases, notice and opt out procedures vis-à-vis “futures” are inherently 
unhelpful because futures do not self- identify and hence cannot be expected to seek out and 
receive information regarding class action proceedings.  As the Second Circuit in Stephenson 
suggested, it is “likely” that “effective” notice can never be provided to persons who have been 
exposed to a toxin but have not yet suffered from the resulting disease or disability.27   
Serious enhancements in notice and opt-out procedures for “presents” hold 
somewhat greater promise.  Enhancements would entail increased litigation/administrative costs,  
and are likely to be opposed by plaintiffs lawyers who would perceive those increased costs as 
cutting into the pools available for class member recovery and class counsels’ fees.  And even if 
                                                 
26  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(1)(3) (providing that for a (b) (3) class action, a court may refuse to approve a 
settlement “ unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to individual class members who had an 
earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not do so.”).  It is not obvious why, given the judicial 
incentives discussed below in Part B, we would expect many judges to demand a second opt-out opportunity 
for class members as a prerequisite for granting approval to a proposed settlement  
27  273 F.3d at 261 n8 (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 US 591, 628(1997)). As the Court in 
Amchem explained, “[m]any people in the exposure-only category . . . may not even know of their exposure, 
or realize the extent of the harm that might occur.  Even if they fully appreciate the significance of class 
notice, those without current afflictions may not have the information or foresight needed to decide, 
intelligently, whether to stay in or opt out.  Family members . . . may themselves fall prey to disease or may 
ultimately have ripe claims for loss of consortium.  Yet large numbers of people in this category – future 
spouses and children  . . . – could not be alerted to their class membership.” 521 U.S. at 628. 
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cost objections could be surmounted, the enhanced notice and opt out procedures still would be 
inadequate basis upon which to presume express or implied consent as to “presents” in those 
(many) cases in which the proposed class action settlement at issue does not provide for 
particular relief for particular class members or groups of class members, but instead sets up 
what is, in effect, administrative processes for the evaluation and payment of individual claims.  
How an administrative process set up by a proposed settlement actually will translate into an 
aggregate amount of relief and particular distributions of relief to particular class members is 
(generally, at any rate) unknowable at the time the settlement is approved.  A standard of 
meaningful consent, informed consent, requires more than class members’ right to opt out of a 
proposed settlement whose consequences for them is unknowable at the time they must decide 
whether to exercise their right.  
Contrary to Nagareda’s claims, analogizing class settlements to administrative 
agency regulations does not show why class actions should be protected against subsequent 
challenges.  Quite the contrary is true: class action settlements are (as Nagareda suggests) 
arguably akin to administrative regulations,28 but administrative law allows affected person and 
entities to challenge a regulation twice: once, in a facial challenge, after the regulation has been 
promulgated but not applied  (which is akin to the time when the settlement is proposed for 
judicial approval), and a second time, in an as-applied challenge, once the regulation has been 
applied to the particular affected person or entity bringing suit (which is akin to when the 
particular class member receives his or her particular relief in accordance with the judicially-
approved settlement).  In other words, the analogy to administrative law supports a rule 
permitting subsequent challenges to class settlements based on inadequacy of representation. 
                                                 
28 See Nagareda, supra note [  ], at 355 (explaining that the “settlements characteristically generated by class 
actions operate in much the same manner as agency rules”). 
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 B. Why Not Just Improve Initial Judicial Review?  
  One standard response to Stephenson- like claims for subsequent review is that such review 
would be unnecessary if initial judicial review – judicial review in the first litigation, the original 
class action -- were improved.  I certainly believe (as do most observers) that the initial review of 
proposed class settlements could be improved, but, for the reasons stated below, I do not think 
any realistically achievable improvements would obviate the need for subsequent  review of 
class action settlements based on inadequacy of representation. 
There are fundamental – structural – reasons why the initial review of class 
settlements always will be less-than-searching in many cases.  As suggested above, sometimes 
no one may understand, when a settlement is proposed, that the settlement as applied will entail 
unjust levels of relief for some class members (although this was hardly the case in the bank 
boston or agent orange litigation – there the problems with the proposed settlement were 
foreseeable at the time of judicial review and approval).  Even when class counsel and/or 
defendants have concrete information that should give rise to adequacy concerns on the part of 
the judge reviewing a proposed settlement, they do not have any incentive to provide such 
information to the judge.  After all, class counsel and the defendants have agreed to a settlement, 
and the very existence of the agreement shows that both class counsel and the defendants believe 
the deal is a good one for them.  Class counsel and defendants have every reason to obscure, if 
they can do so lawfully, any information that might undermine their deal with each other. 
For their part, judges are not well-positioned to ferret out information both class 
counsel and defendants do not wish to disclose or (if already disclosed) highlight.  Despite the 
foray of some trial judges into complex institutional litigation and the use of special masters, 
most trial judges do not have the resources, temperament or training to seek out information on 
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their own.  In our legal system, judges primarily rely on the parties before them to develop 
opposing views and factual support.  When the parties (for all practical purposes, class counsel 
and defendants) agree, a very natural response for a trial judge (typically burdened by a heavy 
caseload) is to approve the settlement without much delay.29  And, assuming there is anyone 
with the resources and standing to appeal, appellate courts are constrained by the record on 
appeal, which, for the reasons just stated, may contain no hard information which would support 
overruling the trial court’s approval of the class settlement. 
   Judges, of course, vary a great deal from one another, and there are examples of 
judges who have scrutinized class settlements for adequacy, and have rejected proposed 
settlements or (in the case of appellate judges) set aside approvals of settlements.  But for an ex 
post check (in the form of a right to subsequent challenges based on inadequacy of 
representation) to be socially desirable (on net), what matters is not that some judges will engage 
in a searching inquiry of the adequacy of representation when presented with a class settlement, 
but rather that some will not, and that the benefits (in terms here primarily of fairness and 
legitimacy) exceed the costs of trying to make up for the failures in the initial review of class 
settlements.30 
  Moreover, there is reason to suspect that judges are sometimes “chosen” for class action 
litigation because they are known to be predisposed to approve class settlements without much 
                                                 
29 There appears to be very broad agreement among commentators that judges have powerful incentives to 
approve class action settlements.  See Susan Koniak & George Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement,  82 U VA 
L REV 1051,1122-1132 (1996).(discussing “Blind, Not Merely Blindfolded, Judges,” and arguing that judges 
have a “strong predisposition toward settlements” that stems from judicial self-interest) Patrick Woolley, The 
Availability of Collateral Attack for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REV. 383, [      ] 
(2000); John C. Coffee, Class Wars, 95 COLUM L. REV. 1343, 1348 (1995); Samuel Issacharoff, Class 
Action Conflicts, 30 UC David  L Rev. 805, 822 (1997). 
30  See Ashby Jones, A Class Act?, American Lawyer and Corporate Counsel (10/8/2003), available at 
www.law.com (reporting that “in the past three years alone . . . federal district and appellate courts have shot 
down parts of or entire class action settlements in California, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Missouri, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, and Washington state.”).  
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scrutiny.  At least under current law, plaintiffs’ lawyers have quite broad discretion to choose the 
courts where they will bring class actions, particularly nationwide class actions.  It stands to 
reason – and anecdotal evidence suggests –that lawyers select courts in which some or all of the 
sitting judges are known to be sympathetic to approving class action settlements.  Madison 
County, Illinois is a famous example of this phenomenon.31 
The Supreme Court’s recent opinions in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor32 and 
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.33, may have reinforced the ability of lawyers to select federal judges 
who are predisposed to lax-review of proposed settlements.  Amchem and Ortiz’s broad language 
regarding the importance of adequacy of representation and the threat of collusion between class 
counsel and defendants34 provide support, if often only indirect or atmospheric support, for 
intense-scrutiny judges – judges predisposed to invest and engage in tough scrutiny in class 
action cases-- to seriously question proposed class certifications and to deny certification.  At the 
same time, Amchem and Ortiz’s fairly narrow, fact-specific, and arguably formalistic holdings35 
certainly allow lax-scrutiny judges -- judges predisposed to engage in lax scrutiny in class action 
cases --to carry on as before Amchem and Ortiz, and readily grant class certification.  As a result, 
                                                 
31 See Lester Brickman, Anatomy of a Madison County (Illinois) Class action: A Study of Pathology, Civil 
Justice Report No. 6, August 2002, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, available at www.manhattan-
institute.org. 
32 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
33 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
34  See, e.g., Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 528 (emphasizing the due process concerns implicated by aggregate actions 
and the due process rationales underlying and giving force to the adequacy of representation requirement) and 
id. at 852 (expressing skepticism that class counsel can be expected to negotiate the best possible deal for all 
class members “given the potential for gigantic fees” that might be lost if no settlement can be reached).  
35  Amchem and Ortiz’s holdings plausibly could be read as pertaining only to the construction of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23, and not the federal constitution, in which case the cases would be inapplicable to state class 
actions.   See, e.g,. Amchem,  521 U.S. at 527 (“This case concerns the legitimacy under Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil procedure of a class-action certification sought to achieve global settlement of current 
and future-related asbestos claims.”).  In addition, the cases could be read as limited to their facts – settlement 
class actions in which there are separate subclasses and counsel for presents and futures – and as requiring 
only that, in the future, the procedural formalities of separate subclasses and counsel for presents and futures 
be observed.  See Ortiz,  527 U.S. at 856 (describing the holding in Amchem to be that “a class divided 
between holders of present and future claims . . . requires division into homogeneous subclasses under Rule 
23©(4)(B), with separate representation . . . “). 
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when certification is granted, the judge is likely to be a lax-scrutiny judge, or at least that is more 
likely to be true after Amchem and Ortiz than it was before.  When certification is denied, class 
counsel is free to try with another judge in another court, since denial of certification has no 
preclusive effect. Amchem and Ortiz, translated into the realities of class action practice, thus 
may have reduced the risk to class counsel that a class action will be certified but then a 
proposed settlement rejected by the court as inadequate.36 
Some commentators have argued that judicial review of settlements can be 
improved by the introduction of more voices into the settlement approval process.  For example, 
Nagareda suggests that competitor plaintiffs law firms should be induced to present critiques of 
proposed settlements by the promise that, if the settlement is disapproved, these competitor firms 
will be appointed the new class counsel.37  But if judges are taking the course of least resistance 
in approving settlements without searching review, would they not continue to do so despite the 
voices of competitor law firms?  Why would anything change simply because the objectors now 
might be entitled to an automatic status as replacement counsel if they scuttle the settlement? 
Wouldn’t competitor law firms lack the information in the possession of class counsel and 
defendants that they need to make strong arguments38? And couldn’t competitor law firms’ 
motives be questioned at least as readily as those of class counsel and defendants?  And given 
the uphill battle facing competitor firms in scuttling proposed settlements, wouldn’t competitor 
firms regard it as more sensible to take side payments from class counsel in return for 
                                                 
36 My analysis here is admittedly highly speculative: to give the analysis more substance one would want to 
know at least four things – the rate of denial of class certification, pre-Amchem/Ortiz and post, and the rate of 
denial of approval of class settlements, pre-Amchem/Ortiz and post.  As far as I know, however, there are no 
studies estimating those rates.  This analysis is also inapplicable to so-called settlement classes, for which 
certification and approval of settlement are sought at the same time.  
37 Nagareda, supra note [  ], at 293. 
38 See Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionists, Free Riders, or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U.C. 
Leg. Forum 403, 413-14 (explaining that objectors are “outside the settlement process, and may lack the 
information needed to effectively evaluate a settlement”). 
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withdrawing their challenges to settlements? Nagareda’s novel proposal, if adopted, might do 
more to change the distribution of wealth among plaintiffs lawyers than it would to ensure better 
representation for absent class members. 
   Nagareda also suggests certain formal requirements to improve judicial review of 
settlements, most notably a requirement of a reasoned explanation in support of the settlement.39  
But class counsel and defendants already do (typically) provide reasoned explanations for their 
proposed settlements, which judges (typically) build on in approving settlements.  A reasoned 
explanation, by itself, is easy to produce: the important question is whether there is anyone in the 
process with the resources, information, incentives, and command to judicial attention to 
critically evaluate the proffered reasoned explanation.   And, as discussed above, it is far from 
obvious that there currently are such people involved in class action litigation, or that there 
would be if Nagareda’s counsel-replacement proposal became law. 
   One group that could significantly improve the quality of judicial review of class 
action settlements are state attorney generals.  Unlike private lawyers, state attorney generals are 
not presumed to be acting on profit motives, and cannot (lawfully) take side payments.  Because 
of their status as public officials entrusted with safeguarding the public interest, state AGs’ views 
command respect; judges are quite accustomed to taking what they say very seriously. The 
principal constraint on state attorney generals as a force to compel more meaningful review of 
proposed class settlements is resources: state attorney generals offices have broad agendas, and 
from either the perspective of a model of political behavior that emphasizes ideological/public 
interest motivations or one that emphasizes politicians’ self- interest in accruing fame/power and 
winning reelection, investing a great deal of time and money in monitoring proposed class action 
                                                 
39 Nagareda, supra note [   ], at 357-59. 
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settlements may not be an attractive course for most state attorney generals.40  I have been 
unable to locate any statistics, but my impression from lawyers in class action practice is that 
state attorney generals appear as objectors or otherwise seek to provide input in very few class 
actions.  
State attorney generals arguably could have a more meaningful role in pursuing 
subsequent challenges to approved settlements than in participating in the initial proceedings 
regarding proposed class settlements.  Compared to the set of proposed class settlements that 
might affect (for example) state attorney generals ’ traditional interest in consumer protection, the 
set of consummated class settlements where the injustice of the settlement has become manifest 
once class members have received their “relief” is bound to be much smaller.  State attorney 
generals cannot possibly try to monitor and understand all of the proposed class settlements that 
may affect consumers but they can, perhaps, look seriously at the relatively few in which a 
number of class members have voiced complaints about what the class settlement actually 
afforded them (e.g., coupons of minimal or no value).  And where the aggrieved class members 
cannot attract private counsel to represent them in the difficult task of challenging a judicially-
approved settlement as inadequate, the state attorney generals can step in (as in Homeside) and 
use their credibility as public officials as a means to command the court’s attention.  Here, too, 
however, there is not much evidence that I could locate that state attorney generals actually have 
taken on this role. 
                                                 
40 The potential payoffs for state attorney generals, in terms of favorably publicity, would seem to be greater 
in launching class actions on their own or, to limit their financial/resource risks, in conjunction with plaintiffs 
law firms, as in the tobacco litigation.  For contrasting views of state AG-plaintiffs lawyer joint efforts in 
bringing class actions, see David Dana, Public Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward a Normative Evaluation 
of Parens Patriae Litigation By Contingency Fee, 51 DePaul L. Rev. 315 (2001); John Coffee, Jr., “When 
Smoke Gets in Your Eyes”: Myth and Reality About the Synthesis of Private Counsel and Public Client, 51 
DePaul L. Rev. 241 (2001).  
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 C.  What Would The Availability of Ex Post Challenges to Class Action Settlements Do to 
Ex Ante Rates of Class Action Litigation and Settlement? 
   Some academic commentators, as well as the petitioners and amici in Stephenson, 
have argued that permitting subsequent challenges to class settlements based on inadequacy of 
representation will undermine the value of the class action settlement for defendants.  According 
to this view, defendants will be dissuaded from settling class actions if those settlements could be 
challenged later, on adequacy of representation grounds.41   The commentators and petitioners’ 
concerns are, at best, exaggerated.  
 The academic commentators and the petitioners in Stephenson assume, albeit 
implicitly, that the threat of subsequent challenges to class action settlements can have only one 
of two effects: plaintiffs lawyers will forego using the class action device as a means of dispute 
resolution because class actions will not be worth the effort unless they can offer challenge-proof 
settlements to defendants, or plaintiffs lawyers and defendants will still litigate class actions in 
the same numbers but, rather than settling, proceed to judgment.  The former effect might be 
considered undesirable because, on one view, class actions are more “efficient” than multiple 
individual actions that, at least sometimes, might take the place of class actions.  The latter effect 
might be considered undesirable because litigation costs are transaction costs that, by 
themselves, do not advance any of the possible objectives of the tort system.   
But even assuming arguendo that fewer class actions or fewer settlements in class 
actions would be a bad thing, those are not the only possible effects of the threat of subsequent 
                                                 
41 See, e.g., Brief of Washington As Amicus Curiae In Support of Petitioners, Dow v. Stephenson, 2002 U.S. 
Briefs 271, at 20 (predicting “a decrease in settlement rates” that “will serve only to further clog the nation’s 
courts”); Brief for Petitioners, Dow v. Stephenson, at 39 (arguing that allowing subsequent review will have 
“pernicious consequences” and that “the threat of such litigation . .  . would make it significantly more 
difficult for parties to settle class action lawsuits”); Kahan & Silberman, supra note [    ], at 779; Allen, 73 
NYU L REV at 1159-60.  
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challenges based on claims of inadequacy of representation. Another possib ility is that class 
counsel and defendants will respond to the threat by making their settlements less susceptible to 
subsequent challenges.  The easiest way for them to do that is to try to ensure that every group 
included in the class will (absent unforeseen circumstances) receive some meaningful relief at 
least roughly proportional to their injuries, and that groups to whom defendants are unwilling to 
promise such relief will be excluded explicitly from the class and the class settlement.  In the 
bank boston litigation, for example, class counsel and defendants could have greatly reduced the 
chance of a subsequent challenge by simply excluding from the class anyone who would receive 
negative “relief” under the relief formula in the settlement.  Similarly, in the agent orange 
litigation, class counsel and the defendants could have lessened the risk of subsequent challenges 
by excluding from the class those who might become ill after 1994, rather than including them in 
the class but denying them any monetary relief.  The threat of subsequent challenge presumably 
also would prompt class counsel to take more care in producing comprehensible class notices 
and notices of settlement, and in supporting opt-out rights at the time of proposed settlements.  
  Of course, it may be impossible for class counsel and defendants to make class 
settlements challenge-proof, if only because they themselves may not be able to anticipate all the 
ways in which administration of relief under the settlement might disadvantage certain class 
members.  The availability of challenges to class action settlements creates a risk, albeit a small 
risk, that even settlements negotiated with the best of intentions will be undone.  The availability 
of such challenges thus does reduce the expected value or payoff for defendants of settling, as 
opposed to going to trial.  But my contention is that the unavoidable risk posed by the threat of 
subsequent challenges – the risk that remains even after class counsel and defendants make all 
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reasonable efforts to ensure adequacy of representation of all class members – is simply not large 
enough to have much effect on expected values and hence litigation decisions. 
  To see why this is so, recall who would bring any subsequent challenges to class 
actions – in almost all cases, plaintiffs lawyers, almost all of whom are (presumably) driven by 
economic/profit maximization concerns.  Even where class counsel and defendants did not do 
anything to ensure adequacy of representation in the original proceeding, a court hearing a 
subsequent challenge is going to be predisposed not to second guess the approval of the 
settlement by the first court, and plaintiffs’ lawyers are going to appreciate that fact.  Hence, 
plaintiffs lawyers are likely to view subsequent challenges as unattractive prospects for making 
money and hence will avoid them.   
Why do I believe that courts are unlikely to embrace subsequent challenges even 
when, as a matter of formal doctrine, aggrieved class members are permitted to bring such actions?  
For one thing, there is such a thing as judicial comity: as a matter of normative commitment, 
judges in one court do not like to criticize judges in another court if they can avoid doing so.  
Moreover, judges’ own incentives to avoid burdensome tasks and free up time to meet pressing 
aspects of their caseload (such as criminal actions) favor their not embracing challenges to class 
settlements.  When a judge rules that a class settlement was based on adequate representation, the 
judge is done with her work – the case disappears from her docket.  If the judge instead rules that 
the previous class settlement was based on inadequate representation, then the judge must address 
the substance of the subsequent challenge, and may become entangled in everything from 
overseeing discovery disputes to summary judgment motions to settlement conferences.  In all but 
a few cases -- outlier cases of judicial behavior --  stark inadequacy of representation in the initial 
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class action proceeding (as was at issue in Homeside and Stephenson) will be required to overcome 
judicial resistance to become mired in the merits of subsequent challenges to class settlements.  
   My claims are supported by the available empirical data.  Until1997, when the 
Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 42the settled rule in every circuit in this 
country was that any absentee (nonparticipating) class member who was purportedly bound by a 
class action settlement could maintain suit on the underlying claims in a new action provided that 
she could show that she had not been adequately represented in the original action43.  Epstein 
called that rule into question, certainly in the Ninth Circuit and to a lesser extent elsewhere.  But 
prior to 1997, in the federal courts at least, there was no significant controversy about the 
availability of subsequent challenges.  Yet the number of subsequent challenges brought was few 
indeed, perhaps fewer than fifty in total.44  These numbers suggest that plaintiffs lawyers 
understand that subsequent challenges, in virtually all cases, are simply not worth pursuing, 
given other available opportunities.  The principal drawback to using subsequent challenges as a 
check on inadequacy of representation in class actions is that it will be (and has been) too weak a 
check, rather than too strong a one.  But we are at least better off with a less-than-fully effective 
check than none at all. 
D. The Inconsistency in the Case Against Allowing Subsequent Challenges 
                                                 
42 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999). 
43See e.g., Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 4455,  at 484-87 
(2002)(describing the Epstein approach as a new approach and contrasting it unfavorably with the traditional 
approach allowing adequacy to be challenged in a collateral proceeding)43; Newberg on Class Actions, 
Section 1625, at 16-133, 16-137 (3rd ed. 1992)  (explaining that Rule 23 Adoes not disturb the recognized 
principle that the court conducting the action cannot predetermine the res judicata effect of the judgment@ and 
that A[d]ue process of law would be violated for the class judgment@ to be held binding Aunless the court 
applying res judicata could conclude that the class was adequately represented in the first suit.@). 
44 See Woolley, supra note [  ], at [   ] n.268 (reporting on the findings of a westlaw survey that identified 
only 44 subsequent challenges); see also Mollie A. Murphy, The Intersystem Class Settlement: Of Comity, 
Consent, and Collusion, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 413, 469 (1999) (explaining that “[c]ollateral attack has been 
used relatively sparingly to attack the adequacy of representation”).    
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   There is an important inconsistency in the arguments advanced against allowing 
subsequent challenges in cases such as Stephenson.  On the one hand, opponents of allowing 
subsequent challenges argue that it was just for Judge Weinstein to have approved a settlement 
denying relief to veterans who might manifest injury after 1994 because the claims of any such 
veterans would have been so rife with causation problems as to be (in expected monetary values, 
calculated in 1984) worthless; thus the denial of relief to such veterans via class action settlement 
was not, in substance, taking anything of value away from anyone.45  At the same time, 
opponents of allowing subsequent challenges suggest that defendants will offer much less – 
perhaps much, much less – to settle claims that leave open contingencies, such as, for example, 
the contingency of lawsuits by veterans who have been exposed to agent orange and who might 
become ill after 1994.46   
Critics of the result in Stephenson (and more broadly of allowing subsequent 
review) cannot have it both ways.  If in 1984 the claims of the veterans who might become ill 
after 1994 had little or no real expected value, then Dow, presumably a risk-neutral, 
economically rational corporate actor, would not have valued a settlement that included such 
veterans much differently than a settlement that excluded such veterans.  On the other hand, if 
the claims of those veterans who might become ill after 1994 had substantial expected value as 
of 1984, then Dow presumably paid much more for a settlement including those veterans than it 
would have paid for a settlement that excluded them.  In that case, however, the veterans who 
became ill before 1994 (and class counsel), in effect, were allocated the settlement value of the 
claims of the veterans who became ill after 1994.  This seems obviously wrong: settlements are 
                                                 
45 Nagareda, supra [  ], at 322 (explaining that “[t]he ten-year term for cash benefits under the Agent Orange 
class settlement appears far from arbitrary . . . when one considers that any veteran would have had an 
exceedingly weak scientific case on the causation element, at least as of 1984, and that the ten-year term for 
cash benefits extended to more than two decades after the last alleged exposure of class members.”).   
46 Brief for Petitioners, Dow v. Stephenson, at 39.  
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not supposed to be vehicles for the non-consensual redistribution of the settlement value of the 
claims of one group of plaintiffs to another group of plaintiffs.  
I suppose one might argue that corporate defendants value finality above all, and 
non-final settlements are just worth a great deal less, solely by virtue of their non-finality, than 
final ones.  But a settlement that excluded veterans who might become sick after 1994 would be 
as final as a settlement that included people who might become sick after 1994.  The former 
settlement would simply be narrower in scope of coverage than the latter.  Breadth of scope of 
coverage and degree of finality with respect to covered claims are two distinct variables.  
Settlements vary tremendously in scope: some settlements cover a few kinds of claims, some 
many, some embrace all potential claimants, others only some potential claimants.  No single 
settlement could ever resolve a corporation’s risks of liability for every conceivable claim by 
every conceivable claimant.  Corporations all the time enter into settlements that only cover 
some of the claims in a given category, or only some of the potential claimants within a given 
category. 
Moreover, even as to the variable of finality per se, the claim that corporations view 
finality as a good in itself runs afoul of a dominant conception of corporate actors (especially 
large corporate actors, such as Dow) as risk neutral, rational actors.  From that conception, a 
settlement that has a 10% chance of being undone surely has less value than one that has no 
chance of being undone, but it may have close to 90% of the value of a challenge-proof 
settlement.  In addition, inasmuch as corporations are run by mangers, and managers (if 
anything) tend to “under-discount” risks to the corporation that would affect the corporation (if at 
all) in the relatively distant future (when the mangers likely will not be there), we might expect 
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mangers to place less weight than the rational actor model predicts on the possibility of 
settlements being challenged successfully in, as in the Stephenson example, ten years time. 
In sum, subsequent review based on adequacy of representation concerns, as in 
Homeside and Stephenson, comports with our basic intuitions of fairness – intuitions that the 
Rawlsian original position powerfully captures.  Such review, moreover, is justified 
notwithstanding (wholly admirable) efforts to improve initial jud icial review of class action 
settlements, and such review will not undermine the class action as a dispute resolution 
mechanism: the number of subsequent review cases will (as in the past) be relatively few, and 
the number of cases in which a court is willing to hold for the plaintiffs in a subsequent review 
challenge will be even fewer.  
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